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Tim Kelsall raises important questions about the meaning of political settlements and 
methods of analysis1. I entirely agree with Kelsall on many issues, but I also think there 
are gaps in the analysis he puts forward, which I address in this response. He argues 
that to be consistent with everyday meaning, as well as to ensure analytical usefulness, 
a political settlement has to be defined as an ‘agreement among powerful social groups 
that ends a conflict and sustains a set of institutions and a distribution of power that 
delivers an acceptable distribution of benefits’ (presumably for the powerful social 
groups in question). This means that for a political settlement to exist there have to be 
agreements to end conflicts; that these agreements have to be sustainable for some time, 
(he suggests at least five years); and the agreements have to include an understanding 
among the powerful that critical institutions have to be protected to prevent an outbreak 
of conflict. Institutions that are not relevant for the distribution of benefits to the 
powerful and therefore outside the conflict-ending agreement are not part of the 
political settlement according to this definition and should be studied at a lower level. 
I am sympathetic to Kelsall’s objectives because we both want to capture what is 
‘settled’ about a settlement, but to my mind his approach faces significant empirical as 
well as analytical problems.  
 
I define political settlements as social orders characterized by distributions of 
organizational power that together with specific formal and informal institutions 
effectively achieve at least the minimum requirements of political and economic 
sustainability for that society. To elucidate the differences between these two 
approaches, I will describe Kelsall’s view of a political settlement as a ‘planned order’, 
where critical institutions preventing conflict are consciously agreed upon by powerful 
groups as a way of distributing rents amongst themselves, and then collectively 
enforced. In contrast, I describe my view of a political settlement as an ‘interactive 
order’ where an identifiable and fairly robust social order exists, but it is the outcome 
of many interactions between groups and not based on any agreement or pact that can 
be identified ex ante. The difference is important because the representation of political 
settlements as consciously planned institutional arrangements does not address some of 
the most profound questions at the heart of institutional analysis, namely what makes 
any institutions or agreements enforceable, or the commitments to adhere to them 
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credible? These questions are at the heart of discussions within modern institutional 
economics and political economy.2 Fundamental questions of free riding, distributive 
conflicts over rents and the credibility of commitments cannot be assumed away by 
asserting that a group of powerful interests have agreed to enforce a set of institutions. 
My approach offers an answer, and also helps us address the related question of great 
policy significance: why do similar agreements and institutions operate differently 
across contexts?3 Without compelling analytical answers to these types of questions, an 
approach to social orders is not credible.  
 
Kelsall’s ‘planned order’ provides answers to these questions but they are not 
satisfactory. He argues that there are groups that have the power to disrupt a political 
settlement distinct from those who do not; that the groups who have disruptive power 
can only achieve peace if they can reach an agreement among themselves (which could 
include repressing some groups); and that when they reach an agreement on an 
allocation of rents that resolves the conflict they will protect this allocation with robust 
institutions. This is the political settlement. Since the powerful have agreed to enforce 
these critical institutions, the argument is they will now be enforced, and the powerful 
will play within these rules. This defines away the fundamental questions in the 
literature about how groups may free ride on agreements they have made, engage in 
distributive conflicts, the difficulty of making credible commitments without external 
enforcement, how informal modifications of institutions happen, and how social orders 
evolve through changes in important institutions, which they continuously do. In the 
language of game theory, the social order problem is essentially a problem of a non-
cooperative game, where we have to explain how order emerges without external 
enforcement of agreements, but Kelsall’s solution implicitly assumes we are in a 
cooperative game where the problem is to reach agreements between groups because it 
can be assumed that agreements will subsequently be enforceable.  
 
My approach to political settlements does not take this for granted. Instead, it sees a 
social order as an outcome of interactions between a large number of groups where the 
outcomes are various degrees of enforcement of formal institutions, informal 
modifications of many of these, and different levels of adherence and support for 
various informal institutions. If these interactions achieve the minimum political and 
economic reproduction conditions of a society, we have a reproducible social order. 
This approach gets to the core components of a complex story of structure and agency, 
and the definition focuses our attention on these components. Depending on the 
distribution of power and capabilities across organizations, these interactions 
collectively add up to outcomes that have certain patterns. We can summarize these 
outcomes in a rate of growth, a Gini coefficient, in measures of overall levels of conflict 
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and violence, and so on. These outcomes are the results of many interactive decisions, 
they are not directly the outcome of agreements between groups, powerful or otherwise 
to achieve specific outcomes.  
 
Regardless of agreements or intentions, a political settlement is only sustainable when 
these collective interactions achieve a minimum set of economic and political outcomes 
that are relevant for that context. The conditions of sustainability are not the same 
across orders. Empirically, we know that some orders survive with levels of violence 
that would probably have resulted in new mobilizations that would change the 
configuration of power, and therefore characteristics of the political settlement, in other 
contexts. We certainly cannot assume that powerful groups get together to consciously 
set up institutions to distribute rents in ways that successfully control violence. This 
would be analytically implausible, and in any case the collective action required for 
reaching such agreements within and across large groups would be beyond herculean.  
 
Kelsall refers to an important example of a political settlement that he believes supports 
his interpretation: the Settlement that marked the emergence of a new social order in 
Britain after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. I agree with him that this is a historically 
important example of a settlement, and one from which the term political settlement is 
arguably derived. It is useful to look in some detail at this example because when we 
apply political settlements analysis to contemporary African and Asian countries, we 
need to make sure that we are not expecting political settlements to be fundamentally 
different in contemporary contexts. I argue that the historical evidence shows that this 
paradigmatic settlement was not based on an ‘agreement’ to end violence and did not 
actually have characteristics that would fit Kelsall’s definition. Rather, it can be 
usefully examined and understood in terms of my approach.  
 
The article is organized as follows. In section one, I discuss the relationship between 
analytical definitions and the everyday understanding of social science concepts, 
including political settlements. In section two, I discuss the paradigmatic case of the 
political settlement that emerged out of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and its 
implications for an analysis of political settlements. In section three, I discuss the 
meaning of agency in an analysis of structure. Kelsall argues that structure has to be 
explained by agency: the agreements of powerful groups keep core institutions defining 
structure in place. I argue that the analytical narrative behind this does not work at a 
number of interdependent levels. Agency does indeed affect structure (and vice versa), 
but agency affects structure through the interactions of many organizations that have to 
be largely self-sustaining. The difference is vitally important to understand for an 
empirically and analytically robust approach to political settlements.  
 
Finally, in section four, I look at two immediate implications of these distinctions. I 
argue that my approach helps us to avoid two types of errors that could follow from a 
definition of a political settlement as a conflict-ending agreement between elites. A 
‘pacts’ approach to political settlements could suggest that if powerful groups could be 
made to agree, they could end a conflict and achieve a political settlement. It could also 
suggest that once such an agreement has been achieved, we should be very careful not 
to upset it as it could unleash conflict. Both conclusions are at best misleading, at worst 
very problematic. Political settlements are not the outcome of agency in this simple 
sense, and it can be dangerous to suggest that they are. They are indeed the outcome of 
the interaction of many, possibly thousands of organizations and their decisions, but 
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this interactive outcome of agency is an entirely different matter from an agreement 
between elites. Moreover, particular political settlements can have many negative 
features and attempting to address these, sometimes even by questioning fundamental 
rent-allocating institutions, will not necessarily trigger violence. This is too 
conservative a position. Political settlements are always evolving and incremental 
changes can add up to significant variations over time. We are entitled to assess the 
economic and political outcomes of a particular political settlement and to provide 
policy advice that can try and nudge its evolution in particular ways. If agreements 
between elites were really so robust, every change in a political settlement would 
require a new agreement or it would trigger violence.  
 
Definitions and everyday discourse  
 
I entirely agree with Tim Kelsall that when we use everyday words like markets, states, 
and politics, we should try to keep close to their everyday meaning. But we should also 
aim to identify the most important characteristics of what is being described so that new 
analytical insights can be derived. For instance, people talking about markets usually 
refer to a place where they go to buy things. But while there are competing analytical 
definitions of markets, none of them focus on markets as places. That is because the 
market as a place detracts from more essential characteristics of markets, which a good 
definition can help to identify and focus on, for instance, by helping to identify the 
conditions for efficient allocative outcomes. Markets have therefore been defined, for 
instance, as institutions enabling transactions based on voluntary contracts with 
freedom of entry and exit. It is true that such a definition risks losing some of our 
everyday audience, who may never have thought of markets as a set of rules. But we 
gain insights that illuminate why we are interested in markets in the first place, as better 
ways of allocating resources than some other alternatives. This particular definition 
enables us to see that all markets may not be places, and that some places claiming to 
be markets may be so coercive that perhaps we should not call them markets at all. It 
also means that there may be more than one way of usefully defining a market, 
depending on the questions we are asking.  
 
In the same way, my definition of political settlements does indeed look at historical 
and everyday references to political settlements. A political settlement is indeed a 
‘settled’ social order, and it is settled because its ‘politics’ achieves sustainability. 
Political settlements understood in this way are important because social orders 
describe the institutional and organizational structure of a society in which agency has 
to be located for policy analysis. This has implications for the operation of institutions 
and policies and the feasibility of different types of institutional and policy changes. 
My definition of a political settlement provides a definition that is useful for addressing 
a broad range of analytical questions of this type. There may, of course, be other ways 
of defining a political settlement to answer somewhat different questions. However, the 
way in which Kelsall elaborates his ‘agreement-based’ or ‘planned order’ definition of 
a political settlement does not work in my opinion, because it violates a number of 
analytical and empirical observations. It is important to interrogate historical examples 
to see what was essential in these orders, and therefore what must be included in a 
general definition and what should be excluded.  
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While the popular usage of the term does indeed often refer to post-conflict agreements 
as marking the emergence of an order, many post-conflict agreements break down and 
many social orders exist and evolve without any identifiable conflict-mitigating 
agreements. So a general definition of a political settlement should certainly be able to 
cover successful post-conflict agreements as a special case but should also be able to 
do much more. Moreover, once we define sustainability in an analytical way, with 
reference to historical evidence, it becomes clear that sustainable social orders do not 
require a total absence of violence (indeed many orders survive with high levels of 
conflict). Finally, the empirical evidence also tells us that the (degree of) enforceability 
of institutions varies greatly across political settlements, so clearly agreements to 
enforce critical institutions, even if they could be found, are not equally credible across 
different contexts.  
 
The level of conflict is not a useful marker for the existence of a reproducible social 
order because the sustainable level of violence appears to depend on how individuals 
and groups respond to violence. A continuously escalating level of violence is unlikely 
to be sustainable because the economy is likely to shrink at an accelerating pace, and 
new mobilizations are likely to emerge in response to deteriorating economic and 
political conditions. But human societies appear capable of adjusting to moderate to 
high levels of violence provided these levels are relatively stable and individuals and 
groups can carry on a wide range of activities that allow the system to reproduce over 
long periods. Nigeria, South Africa, Pakistan or India (just to pick a few important 
countries at random) have had varying levels of internal conflict, including high-
intensity conflicts and violence over long periods. It makes no sense to say these 
societies do not have political settlements because many institutional characteristics of 
these societies are relatively stable, the societies reproduce, and changes are usually 
incremental and evolutionary.  
 
There are moments in the history of these countries, like the Biafra conflict of 1967-70 
or the conflict in East Pakistan in 1971 when violence rapidly escalated and the local 
political settlement could certainly be said to have broken down, but these are relatively 
short-lived episodes. In general, the requirement of a zero or an arbitrarily low level of 
conflict or violence cannot serve as a useful criteria for defining the presence or absence 
of a political settlement. Moreover, the degree of fragility of a political settlement may 
not correspond to the level of ongoing conflict in a simple way. Many social orders 
which suppress discontent and appear to be without conflict can suddenly prove to be 
fragile, like Syria in 2011. Think also of how the Arab Spring was triggered when a 
solitary street vendor called Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in 2010 in Tunisia 
when authorities confiscated his goods.  Tunisia was a relatively stable and high-growth 
economy before that point, but the rapid escalation of violence and disorder shows that 
the previous political settlement was quite fragile. Our analytics should be able to say 
something about the fragility or robustness of political settlements, but we cannot read 
that off from recent levels of violent conflict. For both politics and the economy, 
sustainability therefore has to be carefully understood in terms of the threats to the 
reproducibility of the system.  
 
The end of a conflict can mark a change in the distribution of organizational power, and 
a post-conflict settlement can therefore be a useful marker of a discontinuous break in 
the evolution of power in a society. But social orders can also evolve or change in other 
ways. For instance, today’s British political settlement has evolved through many 
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incremental and discontinuous changes since the 1688 Revolution but without many 
post-conflict declarations. The contemporary British settlement is clearly very different 
from 1688 but how should we identify its characteristics if we are looking for conflict-
ending declarations? Long periods of incremental change can be just as significant as 
bursts of discontinuous change. Focusing only on post-conflict agreements limits, in 
my opinion, the usefulness of the political settlements framework. Other types of events 
can be just as useful as markers for locating points when changes that have been 
gradually happening are judged to be of substantial importance. Dating these points can 
be a matter of debate, but clearly many other markers apart from conflict-ending 
agreements can be useful. For instance, gradual changes in technologies and markets 
can lead to the decline of old industries and the rise of new ones, the growth in 
employment of new groups, like women, or the unemployment of previously employed 
groups, like coalminers. These changes more or less gradually change the distribution 
of power across organizations and can result in significant changes in the distribution 
of organizational power. We can mark these gradual changes with discrete events that 
bring them to public notice, like the collapse of a trade union movement, or the Brexit 
vote of 2016, as long as we remember that the changes that they record developed 
incrementally. A post-conflict agreement or constitution is just a marker, no different 
from an unexpected election result or the defeat of a once-powerful union in a strike, 
on the basis of which we may hypothesize significant changes in the underlying 
distribution of power and the emergence of new coalitions.  
 
These inflexion points in evolutionary paths are initially a matter of judgement in the 
first instance, and sometimes the distribution of organizational power may also change 
without clear markers. But observations over time of a variety of evidence on 
organizational power and institutional operation can help determine whether a 
hypothesis of changes in the distribution of power can be verified, whether they are 
holding up over time, evolving in particular directions, or being reversed. The more 
stable and reinforcing a distribution of power becomes, the more our analysis of a 
political settlement should take it into account. The effects of a ruling coalition 
introducing particular policies or institutions, including constitutional settlements, 
depend on how the universe of organizations, including apparently not-so-powerful 
ones, respond to these changes. This is why many post-conflict constitutional 
agreements fail to achieve their intended effects, as do many ‘normal’ institutions and 
policies. Agreements, like institutions, even when ratified as constitutions, are simply 
declarations of intended formal institutional arrangements. These may or may not be 
implementable in practice. The task of analysis is to identify the conditions that make 
a settlement sustainable both in an immediate sense and over time. A document or 
agreement prepared by a few leaders of ostensibly powerful organizations may mark a 
significant shift in the distribution of power, but it may also be a trivial exercise that 
history will not remember.  
 
My definition of a settlement may appear to be somewhat different from the everyday 
understanding because I want to identify general characteristics of political settlements 
that can also help us understand why ‘agreements’ to support particular institutions hold 
up in the subset of settlements where agreements appear to be important. This approach 
does not avoid critical questions about the credibility of commitments and the 
enforceability of formal institutions. The important insight is that the enforcement of 
particular institutions depends on the distribution of organizational power across 
different types of organizations affected by that institution. If a group of powerful 
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leaders were really powerful enough to set up institutions to protect their rents, it would 
be hard to explain why they would not also agree to modernize the economy and 
multiply many times over the rents they get. The power of powerful organizations in 
developing countries may be much less than Kelsall assumes, a point I come back to 
later.4  
 
In general, the claim that some institutions are simply going to be enforced because 
some powerful groups have decided that they should be is not analytically credible. 
Who are these powerful groups, how do we know they really have agreed, or that they 
have the power to enforce, or (most importantly) that their inter-group and internal 
agreements will not break down? Powerful groups are no different from other groups, 
they may try to free ride on agreements and they may disagree about the distribution of 
rents, so an agreement to protect a set of permanent institutions cannot be self-
sustaining in the general case. I will elaborate these points with reference to the 
settlement that emerged after the Glorious Revolution. If an agreement among the 
powerful to end conflict did not exist even in this paradigmatic case of a settlement, the 
relevance of a definition based on conflict-ending agreements becomes very 
questionable. 
 
Finally, for me the evolutionary dynamics of a settlement is the most important feature 
determining its long-term sustainability. This describes the direction of the institutional 
and organizational changes that are likely to be allowed by the configuration of 
organizational power and capabilities. Of course, ‘allowed’ does not mean necessitated. 
There is nothing deterministic about political settlements, and agency plays a big role 
in determining the actual directions of travel. The key point is that a dynamically 
sustainable settlement is one that can evolve incrementally without too many serious 
discontinuous disruptions, and which can maintain or improve levels of economic and 
political performance. As they evolve, the distribution of organizational power within 
political settlements inevitably changes, but in the general case this does not lead to 
huge outbreaks of violence. In the general case, important incremental institutional 
changes are always happening, and many of these do not need renegotiations of 
agreements protecting the rents of the powerful. This is an unnecessary and empirically 
incorrect assumption to make in the definition of a political settlement. 
 
The evolutionary path of political settlements depends on the strategies of cooperation, 
conflict, production and rent seeking of a variety of organizations. What matters is the 
relative power of these organizations because this is a critical factor determining their 
strategies and their outcomes. Their relative power in turn depends on ‘structure’, the 
configuration of organizational power at a macro-level, which helps us understand how 
a particular organization at a micro-level can relate in collaborative or conflictual ways 
with others. On the other hand, the collective ‘agency’ of organizations affects 
economic and political outcomes, and over time can change the structure, the 
configuration of power at the macro-level. These macro-level changes in structure are 
not negotiated as agreements between powerful groups. Rather, they are outcomes as 
agency interacts with structure in a relatively decentralized way. This is an important 
difference between our two approaches and one that will be elaborated later. As 
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observers, we can judge the implications of an evolving political settlement for 
delivering desirable development outcomes, like maintaining low levels of violence, 
reducing poverty, achieving economic inclusion, enhancing political rights and so on. 
We can also analyse the likely feasibility and effectiveness of particular institutional 
and policy changes to achieve outcomes in line with our own values, in the form of 
policy advice to groups whose interests may be aligned with these objectives.  
 
 
The Glorious Revolution and the interpretation of ‘agreements’ 
 
I will illustrate some of these issues with reference to the political settlement that 
emerged out of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 before discussing the analytical 
implications in the next section. I agree that 1688 was a paradigmatic case of a political 
settlement, that it was robust, and that it had significant implications for subsequent 
development. But I take issue with the claim that this was a conflict-ending agreement 
that set up institutions to protect the rents of the powerful. An examination of the 
historical facts suggests that this post hoc interpretation is not supported by the 
evidence. The factors that made this settlement stable and determined its evolutionary 
outcomes cannot be read off either from the Bill of Rights of 1689 or the Act of 
Settlement of 1701, the two ‘agreements’ that defined the settlement, or any other 
agreements made at that time. Moreover, these settlement agreements did not even 
intend to end the most important conflict, that between Catholics and Protestants. The 
settlement institutions were a small subset of the institutions that determined Britain’s 
economic and political dynamics and the distribution of rents in the subsequent period. 
What is more, the institutions set up under the Bill and the Act rapidly evolved in 
subsequent years, suggesting that they were not core institutions allocating rents to 
prevent conflict, and they were certainly not immutable. The most important feature of 
the political settlement of 1688 was rather a relatively small shift in the distribution of 
power that led to a different evolutionary path for Britain, accelerating its capitalist 
transformation. The characteristics of the organizations that benefited and lost out as a 
result of this shift in the configuration of power is for me the most significant aspect of 
that political settlement. This reconfiguring of power had truly massive long-term 
evolutionary implications and one that our definition helps to capture.  
 
At the heart of the Glorious Revolution was a Dutch invasion of England led by William 
of Orange to overthrow James II, the Catholic king of England, Scotland and Ireland. 
The Bill of Rights of 1689 legalized this successful coup, re-established the primacy of 
the Anglican religion, and established a constitutional monarchy where the king was 
constrained by parliament. Further restrictions on the rights of the new monarch, 
William, were introduced in the Act of Settlement of 1701 and the constitutional 
monarchy continued to be reformed in subsequent decades. While we can all agree that 
there was a significant break in the evolutionary path of the political settlement, the 
question is what was the significance of the ‘agreements’ enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
and the later Act of Settlement or any other agreements that we can find in that period? 
Are these agreements themselves the ‘settlement’, did they intend to end conflict and 
did they actually end the conflict, were they agreed upon by all powerful groups, and 
did they set out the critical institutions that powerful groups agreed needed to be 
enforced to protect a set of benefits to prevent a return to conflict? The answer to all of 
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these questions is no, or at best, not really5. And that is not surprising given the 
implausibility of enforceable collective agreements between large groups.  
 
The first important observation is that the settlement agreements were not even about 
ending conflicts. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants continued after 1688. 
Nothing in the Bill of Rights or the Act of Settlement aimed to end this central conflict 
with any allocation of rents or agreements with the Catholics. Instead, the Bill of Rights 
and the Act of Settlement articulated an intention to enforce with greater vigour already 
existing institutions that had led to some of the conflicts, namely restrictions on the 
rights of Catholics and constitutional principles that limited the power of the monarch. 
The enforcement of these institutions had simply become more feasible as a result of a 
shift in the distribution of power and a reconfiguration of coalitions that evolved as a 
result of a foreign invasion. The institutions themselves were not new. As long ago as 
1215, the Magna Carta, an earlier ‘agreement’ between a king and his barons, had 
asserted the principle that kings should only rule with the consent of the taxpaying 
barons. But that agreement had been immediately annulled and was never effectively 
implemented. The constitutional monarchy at the heart of the 1688 settlement revived 
this institution and its enforcement was attempted once again on the basis of a new 
configuration of power. Similarly, the supremacy of the Anglican religion had been 
established more than a century earlier by Henry VIII as part of his state-building 
strategy. The re-establishment of Anglicanism and the exclusion of Catholics from 
public life, the second plank of the settlement, was also clearly the revival of an earlier 
institution. These institutions had been repeatedly overturned and fought over because 
the balance of power between shifting coalitions had not supported their effective 
implementation.  
 
However, the structure of the economy and society had changed gradually over time. 
The complex coalition of interests demanding a constitutional monarchy had grown 
stronger, as had those who wanted to construct a nation-state independent of continental 
Catholic powers. The Dutch invasion provided the small but critical tilt in the balance 
of power in favour of the diverse coalition who wanted these institutions, allowing them 
to suppress those who were opposed to them. As many powerful groups including 
Catholics, the King and his followers, and aristocratic landed interests had resisted these 
institutions in the past, the immediate result of the invasion was an increase in conflict 
over subsequent years until the older forces were militarily defeated, initially with the 
help of the Dutch forces. Many powerful groups did not ‘agree’ at all with the Dutch 
invasion, the expulsion of the legitimate king, or the exclusionary institutions 
reinforced after 1688. Violence by Catholics to restore James continued, particularly in 
Ireland for many years. Memories of William’s bloody victory in the Battle of the 
Boyne in 1690 can still evoke passion and violence in Northern Ireland. The gradual 
achievement of peace after 1688 can only be described as the reaching of an agreement 
amongst the powerful by doing quite a lot of violence to the word.  
 
Secondly, not only were powerful defeated interests not part of the agreement, the 
winning side was also deeply divided. It is not even possible to say there was an 
agreement among them. The conflicts ostensibly about religion and the rights of the 
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monarchy were banners under which complex coalitions had formed with conflicting 
and overlapping interests. Beliefs, ideologies and personal ambitions all played a role, 
but there were also identifiable economic and political interests. Since the sixteenth 
century, there was a growing capitalist transformation in agriculture, leading to 
conflicts between aristocratic landed interests and emerging capitalist ones. The 
Enclosures were converting common village land into private land to create capitalist 
sheep farms but they also undermined peasant agriculture and created an agrarian 
proletariat. The monarchical state initially resisted the Enclosures, partly because of 
public order threats, but also to prevent enclosing landlords becoming too powerful. 
These processes had driven agrarian conflicts that occasionally contributed to 
escalations of violence as in the Civil War of the 1640s.6 By 1688 there were many 
capitalist landlords who wanted constitutional restrictions on the monarchy and greater 
powers for parliament. They saw this as a way of guaranteeing their property rights 
from monarchical encroachments and developing further institutions to promote their 
interests. Capitalist interests in commerce and industry were even more in favour of a 
constitutional monarchy, to make the executive more accountable in its spending and 
to ensure that policies reflected the interests of modern sectors. On the other hand, 
aristocratic interests wanted a stronger monarch as a way of protecting hereditary rights. 
As a result, though many of them were anti-Catholic, they opposed the Bill of Rights 
in the House of Lords and only partially conceded at the very end. The military 
intervention had cornered them and forced them to make strategic choices. They 
decided that protecting the powers of the monarch could lead to a Catholic revival and 
would also involve taking a position against William’s forces. 
 
A very important part of the story is the fact that ‘landed’ and ‘moneyed’ interests were 
not corporate groups that had solved their own internal collective action problems to 
take a collective position on rents or institutions. In reality, they were complex 
coalitions whose individual components could change their positions relatively easily. 
These conflicting interests temporarily came together in 1688 to support the Bill of 
Rights in a short-lived alignment of interests that was based on many strategic and 
opportunistic calculations, undoubtedly influenced by the presence of a Dutch army. 
That this was a compromise that no side expected to last for long is demonstrated by 
the intense conflicts between conservative landed interests and the newly emerging 
capitalists after 1688, often coming close to violence.7 The Whigs representing the 
emerging capitalist and trading interests proceeded to further limit the powers of the 
monarchy, re-interpreting and contravening the spirit of the agreements they had 
recently made with landed interests.8  
 
As the balance of power continued to shift, aristocratic interests could not resist a series 
of changes that went against them. This was the beginning of decades of conflicts 
between Whigs and Tories with the tide gradually shifting in favour of the former and 
the emerging capitalist interests that they broadly represented. It is not plausible to 
argue that there was an enforceable agreement within the winning groups about the 
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institutions that would regulate their rents. Wars with the French also continued and 
intensified, and these too had significance for internal politics as a defeat could have 
allowed the return of James. Given the internal conflicts and external wars, the 
‘settlement’ could hardly have appeared to contemporaries as a decisive end of conflict 
or a robust agreement amongst all powerful groups about critical institutions necessary 
to end the conflict.  
 
So how should we understand this settlement to be consistent with these observations? 
The mosaic of interests across many different types of organizations meant that 
coalitions could be constructed in different ways. The problem was not that the 
powerful organizations who were fighting had to reach an agreement in order to stop 
the fighting. Rather, the problem was to construct coalitions of the powerful and not-
so-powerful that were sufficiently powerful to rule. How this coalition was put together 
had deep consequences for the operation of institutions at all levels of society. 
William’s invasion with around 15,000 mercenaries was sufficient to tilt the balance in 
favour of groups linked to emerging capitalist interests and the modernization of the 
state. It also forced strategic realignments by some aristocratic landed interests to 
support the winning coalition because successful resistance to a constitutional 
monarchy now looked less feasible. This produced the coalition that signed the Bill of 
Rights. But this signing did not mean that they reached collective agreements about 
rents and institutions. It was not as if different types of landlords, Anglican interests, 
commerce and industry each had identifiable groups, that these groups wanted rents, 
and that they sat together to agree on institutions that gave each of them an agreed share 
of rents. Rather, quite a disparate group of organizations came together in a coalition to 
create institutions whose rents remained disputed amongst themselves. The coalition 
was simply the best option for them at the time, but it was clear that many of the groups 
within the winning group would continue to try to renegotiate a better deal. This 
political settlement, therefore, has to be understood as a new configuration of power 
that allowed the emergence and enforcement of a particular set of institutions. What 
made this political settlement noteworthy were its dynamic characteristics.  
 
This takes me to my third point. Historians have convincingly argued that the critical 
institutions that defined the dynamics of British society in the eighteenth century cannot 
be read off from the Bill of Rights or the Act of Settlement.9 The evolution of critical 
economic institutions like the rules underpinning the Bank of England, the gradual 
modernization of the state and its finances, or the organization of the party system were 
arguably much more important for allocating rents in ways that ensured economic and 
political stability. These institutions emerged in the decades after the settlement and 
radically changed the allocation of rents, disadvantaging landed interests, one of the 
groups supporting the 1688 settlement. Far from powerful groups collectively 
protecting institutions, important institutional innovations were driven by ongoing 
internal and international conflicts.10 Wars created the demand for more money to 
finance them and taxation increased as a result, but with parliamentary accountability 
so did the military effectiveness of the state. Limiting the power of the monarch and the 
aristocracy expanded the policy space for private enterprise. This not only helped the 
domestic capitalist sector but also allowed private organizations like the East India 
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Company to operate more freely, changing the global distribution of power in the next 
half century. The most significant aspect of the 1688 settlement was that it allowed a 
different co-evolution of institutions and organizations that benefited the expansion of 
British capitalism. These institutions radically changed the distribution of rents, and 
also Britain’s position in the world.  
 
The immediate characteristic of the Revolution settlement, far from the construction of 
mutually agreed institutions to share rents, was the better enforcement of a number of 
already existing but divisive institutions. But the unintended longer-term consequence 
of these exclusionary institutions was to empower a number of groups who had 
significant productive potential to use these opportunities to further enhance their own 
productivity and the modernization of the state. Therefore, the much more important 
aspect of 1688 was the dynamic characteristics of the new political settlement and the 
way it enabled incremental changes in institutions and organizations over the 
subsequent decades. It did not fix critical institutions, rather the reverse. The settlement, 
seen as a new configuration of power, allowed institutional changes in ways that 
reinforced an accelerating capitalist transformation, allowing deeper economic and 
political stability over time, albeit with ongoing conflicts.  
 
This focus on power, capabilities and evolution in seventeenth century England can 
help us to understand better why the Dutch intervention in England was so different in 
terms of long-term implications compared to US, French and other interventions in 
Afghanistan, Mali or the Central African Republic in recent years. Like the Dutch 
intervention in England, these external interventions did help local coalitions win or 
retain power and helped sustain some institutions that winners claimed were important 
for ending ‘the conflict’. However, in these recent examples, the tilt in the balance of 
power did not trigger similar dynamic developments because of differences in the 
capabilities and power of domestic organizations. The distribution of power did not 
become ‘indigenized’ in sustainable capabilities of domestic organizations. This is 
because unlike seventeenth century England, the winning coalitions in say Afghanistan 
were not linked to capitalist forces of agrarian transformation who could use the small 
boost in their holding power to drive further institutional changes to enhance their 
productivity and competitiveness. The political settlement of 1688 was significant 
because of this evolutionary dynamic—not the rigidity of its institutions. Without that 
dynamic, the military victory of a coalition remains just that. Reproducible social orders 
of some variety do emerge, but they may require lasting external interventions to sustain 
them, often with high levels of ‘normal’ violence.11  
 
Our approach can also explain why the much lauded Magna Carta of 1215 actually had 
a very unimpressive history compared to the lasting effects of the Bill of Rights of 1689. 
The configuration of power and capabilities changed significantly between these two 
‘agreements’. Magna Carta was much more directly an agreement to end a conflict 
between an unpopular king and his barons, but it failed miserably when it came to be 
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implemented. This is because Magna Carta was signed at a time when the power of 
productive groups was not distributed widely enough for checks and balances on the 
monarch to be effective. It was annulled shortly afterwards, and then repeatedly revived 
and shelved in the centuries that followed.  
 
 
Agency, power and rents  
 
The discussion of 1688 is relevant for refining our understanding of political 
settlements for contemporary applications in Africa and elsewhere. Kelsall’s definition 
of a political settlement is derived from a particular reading of events like those of 1688 
to develop an analytical narrative to describe how the social order came about. This 
analytical narrative is flawed and therefore Kelsall’s definition of political settlements 
is misleading. The narrative begins with a binary distinction between groups that are 
powerful enough to disrupt a social order and those that are not. A second binary claim 
is that all the groups who are powerful have to reach a collective agreement to end 
conflict by creating institutions that share rents, otherwise we will have conflict or a 
stalemate. The logic is that if a social order exists, an agreement between all powerful 
groups must have emerged because if any powerful group was left out of the agreement, 
they would disrupt the order (unless they are repressed). The third binary distinction is 
that powerful groups can then either work within the institutions they have created (and 
which they agree are necessary for keeping the peace), or they can try to change these 
institutions (leading to conflict). As the core institutions were constructed to create just 
the right distribution of rents across powerful groups, Kelsall concludes that the latter 
will not attempt to change these institutions because this will result in violence. Kelsall 
then distinguishes between real ‘political settlements’ where core institutions are stable 
because they are based on these types of agreements and ‘stalemates’ which are 
reproducible social orders but not based on agreements. Social orders may reproduce 
without agreements but he argues that these orders can be rapidly overturned and are 
therefore described as stalemates. This appears to be a plausible line of argument, but 
each of the binary distinctions on which it depends is unsustainable.  
 
Kelsall’s first claim is that we can distinguish between groups that have the power to 
‘overturn’ or seriously disrupt a settlement from those that do not have such a power. 
If we can identify the organizations that are powerful in this sense, all of them have to 
agree on a distribution of rents or be repressed if conflict is to stop. Without such an 
agreement, or their repression, powerful organizations demanding a bigger share of 
rents will disrupt or ‘overturn’ the social order. Neat as this argument is, the 
classification of organizations in terms of disruptive power is very misleading. 
Individual organizations rarely if ever have the power to overthrow or seriously disrupt 
a political settlement on their own, independently of what other groups are doing. If 
there were such organizations, it would be incredibly difficult to reach any agreements 
with them. In reality, a wide range of groups have some disruptive power, but typically 
no group by itself can ‘overturn’ or seriously disrupt a social order unless the collective 
responses of many other groups allow this to happen. This is even true for groups like 
the army, perhaps one of the few groups that could in theory significantly disrupt a 
social order on its own, particularly in developing countries, where productive groups 
are relatively weak. But even armies realize that their power is limited because without 
the consent of many other groups, their attempts to extract more rents through 
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disruption can induce weaker organizations to construct coalitions that can collectively 
block them. This is why when military leaders rule in developing countries, they 
typically do so by linking with a variety of allies to counter-balance existing networks. 
Many of these allies may themselves not be very powerful, but their collective support 
is critical. For instance, military governments in countries like Uganda or Pakistan have 
often sought to check established patron-client networks by constructing new networks 
involving lower-level groups at the village or provincial level, who in turn thereby 
become powerful relative to other local level groups.  
 
The power of any individual group thus depends not only on its internal economic, 
political or military characteristics and its success in solving its collective action 
problems, but also (and critically) on the networks and coalitions they can form and the 
responses of other groups. Power is always relational. This is why patron-client 
networks play such an important role in my analysis of political settlements and the 
evolution of institutions.12 A group that appears not to be powerful, such as a village-
level political faction, can be powerful in a local context because they are part of a 
particular patron-client network or coalition involving higher level groups. This is why 
I think Kelsall is wrong to say that we can clearly limit a political settlements analysis 
to institutions that deliver rents to powerful organizations and the organizations that 
have the power to disrupt the social order. We cannot do that with any clarity because 
we do not have a list of organizations that have disruptive potential. Powerful networks 
and coalitions have complex ramifications that need to be explored and may involve 
groups that are not in themselves powerful. In addition, these networks can change and 
evolve over time. Weak organizations may wield considerable localized power 
depending on how they are networked. It is therefore important to abandon a binary 
approach in the analysis of organizational power. Kelsall is aware of this complexity, 
for instance in the discussion around his Figure 2, but the narrative of agreements of 
the powerful is not consistent with a nuanced understanding of how power is structured.  
 
Because coalitions can be refashioned, ruling coalitions are not predetermined, nor are 
their strategies of staying in power. Some powerful groups can be, and often are, 
excluded from a ruling coalition because the coalitions they can construct are not 
powerful with respect to other coalitions. When this happens, institutional changes can 
take place that not only affect their access to rents, but also allow further incremental 
institutional changes that may make it difficult for them to come back. This is what 
happened to landed interests or the Catholics in 1688. This is also why the exclusion of 
powerful organizations often does not require repression. Some powerful organizations 
may fight back violently (like the Catholics did for a while) but others may not (such 
as the much more powerful landed interests). Responses depend on perceptions of the 
responses of others and the chances of organizing new coalitions. Thus, powerful 
excluded groups may choose not to engage in disruption because of strategic 
calculations (for instance because they need to build coalitions before they can act), or 
because of other compulsions (for instance because their survival depends on 
transactions that would be threatened by disruption), or, as Kelsall recognizes, because 
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of threats of repression. These complex responses are not stalemates. They are the 
normal operating procedures in any political settlement, and therefore a ‘stalemate’ 
according to his definition would be impossible in practice to distinguish from what he 
calls ‘real’ political settlements.  
 
Kelsall’s second claim is that powerful groups have to reach long-lasting agreements 
amongst themselves to fix institutions allocating rents. This is implausible for a number 
of reasons, some implicit in the previous discussion. As the configuration of power is 
always incrementally evolving, organizations cannot agree to fix the distribution of 
rents in any credible sense. In my political settlements analysis, the distribution of rents 
across organizations does tend to get aligned with the configuration of power, but it 
does so through many different adjustments brought about by horizontal interactions 
between organizations, changes in production and rent-seeking strategies and so on. 
This is how agency operates in complex systems without the third party enforcement 
of contracts. The alignment of rents with the distribution of power cannot plausibly 
happen by the powerful organizations coming together and agreeing to a distribution of 
rents by setting up appropriate institutions. Thus, while Kelsall and I both agree that the 
distribution of rents and the distribution of power are brought into line, we are 
identifying radically different processes through which this happens.  
 
Kelsall’s method of alignment is based on positing that a group of powerful 
organizations exists, they have the power to enforce institutions, they agree to enforce 
institutions that achieve a distribution of rents to stop conflict, and this constitutes a 
political settlement. I have tried to show that almost no step in this narrative is credible. 
In my analysis, an alignment of power and rents nevertheless tends to happen through 
horizontal interactions across organizations. Organizations that find themselves in 
coalitions lacking power are unable to protect their rents, and those who do can mobilize 
their power to create formal and informal institutions to further reinforce their rents or 
capture more. This is effectively what was happening in England after the 1688 
settlement. In developing countries, where the capitalist sector is even less developed 
and power is typically organized through patron-client networks, the processes can be 
more complex.  Powerful organizations like some large firms or middle peasants can 
lose rents if they are in weaker networks, while other large firms or peasants can gain.13 
If organizational structures and capabilities are such that the winners seek rents in ways 
that further enhance productivity, create jobs or open up political opportunities, and this 
was the distinctive feature of many of the winning organizations in England at that time, 
the networks who are powerful tend to get even more powerful and their rents become 
more stable. The two approaches to describing how alignment happens are based on 
very different underlying models of how agency and structure interact. 
 
In my understanding of a political settlement, we need to look at a broader range of 
organizations to identify configurations of power that can depend on networks 
involving many lower-level organizations that can be put together in different ways. It 
would be very misleading to rule out any group as irrelevant for the political settlement. 
Similarly, in my approach, all institutions are potentially subject to a political 
settlements analysis for the same reason. Apparently trivial village level institutions for 
water sharing may be distorted and modified by powerful local-level organizations 
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whose relative power vis-à-vis other organizations cannot be understood without 
locating them within relevant vertical or horizontal networks. Clearly, given the 
complexity of social organization, we have to be selective in our description and 
analysis from a practical point of view. We are entitled to use metonymic abbreviations 
like ‘the Catholics decided’ or the ‘landed interests agreed’ as long as we realize these 
are summaries of complex interactions within and across groups and that the power of 
these groups depend on their relationships with others.14 If Kelsall used ‘agreements’ 
in the same metonymic sense, there would be no significant difference with my method. 
But if he really means that powerful groups sit together and make agreements to allocate 
rents, I believe that is wrong both in terms of a description of empirical processes as 
well as being analytically implausible in terms of missing enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Kelsall’s final claim follows from his first two. This is that once a conflict-ending 
agreement emerges, powerful groups will play within these rules, and thus core 
institutions will be robust. This claim too breaks down if we understand that no such 
binding agreements exist. Indeed, formal institutions are generally weakly enforced and 
informal modifications are common in developing countries going through social 
transformations.15 A rent seeking analysis of institutions and institutional change tells 
us that all societies have a variety of rules that are more or less rigid (formal and 
informal institutions), and all societies are also continuously contesting these rules 
through intense rent seeking activities.16 Given the huge payoffs of rent seeking, it is 
implausible to believe that powerful groups will be able to organize collective action to 
ensure that some set of institutions will be out of bounds for distortion or change 
through rent seeking for all powerful groups. Challenges to fundamental institutions is 
normal in all political settlements. Sometimes this can result in conflicts, and this is 
why conflicts exist in all political settlements. But many rent-seeking activities 
affecting fundamental rent-creating institutions do not result in conflicts for reasons 
already discussed, and moreover the relative power of the powerful also changes over 
time. The difference claimed between elites who are playing within the rules (in a 
political settlement) and those who are attempting to change the rules (in a stalemate) 
is therefore analytically not very useful. Kelsall is clearly right in saying that social 
orders must have many robust institutions. The task of political settlements analysis is 
to identify what these are and why they are robust, but we can only do that by looking 
at how institutions emerge out of interactions across organizations given the 
characteristics of the macro-configuration of power. The mistake is to believe that 
institutions are robust because a group of elites have decided that they must be.  
 
We can now connect the rent-seeking analysis with that of violence and conflict. Rent 
seeking is the process through which policies and institutions evolve. In developing 
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countries, formal rules are not well-enforced. Powerful organizations do not support the 
enforcement of formal rules to the extent that we observe in advanced countries because 
their business models do not require complex contracting and the enforcement of a rule 
of law to the same extent. Rent seeking is therefore likely to be associated with rule 
violations in developing countries and rule-violating rent seeking can easily escalate 
into violence. This is ‘normal’ given the characteristics of developing country political 
settlements, and therefore the presence of conflict or even some violence does not 
necessarily tell us that the political settlement is breaking down or absent. Political 
settlements can break down, for instance if many of the institutions necessary for 
system reproduction collapse. But these are relatively rare events.  
 
Countries like Afghanistan do indeed pose a challenge for political settlements analysis 
because it appears that powerful groups disagree violently. But powerful groups 
disagree violently (in the metaphorical sense) in many countries, including for instance 
in the United States in recent years, and actual levels of violence are high in many 
developing countries, including in neighbouring Pakistan or India, even if not as high 
as in Afghanistan. It will be hard to agree on the level of violence at which we say a 
political settlement has disappeared. An easier question to ask is whether the key 
institutions, formal and informal, that are important for system reproduction, are 
reproducing. Even if reproduction requires external assistance, we need to understand 
the characteristics of the system reproduction and its implications for dynamics. 
Moreover, different types of external assistance can play a critical role in the system 
reproduction of many developing countries. This does not mean that all these 
settlements are dynamically sustainable, that is a different assessment, and we need to 
look at the direction of their evolution in the way I suggested earlier. From this 
perspective we could say, perhaps without too much controversy, that the political 
settlement in Afghanistan is only sustainable with a substantial and persistent 
international intervention. The challenge for progressive friends of Afghanistan is not 
to ask how we ‘create’ a political settlement there, but to ask what can be done to nudge 
its political settlement in ways that productive organizations are strengthened and the 
system remains sustainable with declining international military support.  
 
I can now summarize what I see as the fundamental differences between our 
approaches. Kelsall essentially sees a political settlement as a ‘planned order’. They are 
planned because they are based on a deliberately made set of agreements amongst an 
identifiable group of powerful organizations to set up institutions that they collectively 
agree are required to stop conflicts: these institutions are therefore likely to be robust 
and difficult-to-change. This implies that political settlements change only very 
occasionally and in discrete steps, and each change will require a new set of agreements. 
It follows that the analysis of political settlements should be limited to examining these 
big shifts in core institutions, leaving other institutional analysis to other methods.  
 
My approach to political settlements is radically different. It sees a political settlement 
as an ‘interactive order’. Political settlements are not based on agreements between the 
powerful or anyone else. The powerful are not a discrete set of organizations because 
power is usually based on networks and coalitions. Moreover, there are no enforcement 
agencies for policing agreements between groups, so while the ‘powerful’ can have 
plans and make agreements, like everyone else, the actual outcome at a systemic level 
is an interactive one that depends on the responses of all organizations to each other’s 
plans and actions. In this conception, social orders also have rigidity; they usually 
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change relatively slowly and their characteristics are stable enough in most cases to be 
an object of study, but they are not fixed by agreement.  
 
In the ‘interactive order’ view, political settlements have an order in the same way that 
a market economy has an order. There was a time when some economists believed that 
a planned economy could impose an order by agreement (the plan), but we know that 
actual outcomes in planned economies depended on the responses of millions of 
decision-makers to the ‘plan’. There was always a significant gap between plan and 
reality. What this means is that planned orders where powerful groups were apparently 
making the plans, were actually interactive orders in my sense because plans could not 
be fully implemented, even in one-party states.17 In the same way, when the 
configuration of power in a developing country appears to be highly skewed, it may 
look like a few powerful organizations are imposing an order on the rest of society. But 
even in these contexts, the story is much more complex, and a more sophisticated 
mapping of the configuration of power is required to understand differences in 
outcomes between these societies.18 Individuals and organizations have agency, but no 
group, even a group of the ostensibly powerful, can impose society-level institutions or 
policies unless these are aligned with the interests of and their enforcement is 
compatible with the holding power of many organizations affected by these institutions.  
 
Organizations at all levels of society support or resist the implementation of institutions 
depending on their interests and their relative power vis-à-vis other organizations at that 
level. This interactive process brings about an alignment of power and rents more 
realistically, and without falling into traps of asserting non-credible agreements. It also 
means many apparently not-very-powerful organizations can capture rents if they are 
part of patron-client networks or other types of coalitions that give them localized 
power. The interactive-order approach also suggests that the political settlement is 
always incrementally evolving, but it can have occasional discontinuous step changes. 
In this adjustment process, institutions, organizations and configurations of power 
mutually adapt. Finally, in the interactive order approach, the political settlements 
framework is potentially relevant for the analysis of all institutions, because the 
operation of any institution is affected by the relative power of organizations at the 
appropriate level of analysis.  
 
Implications  
 
There are two further important implications of the differences between my analysis of 
a political settlement and that offered by Kelsall. First, if we fail to understand the 
complexity of the organizational interactions that result in a social order, we can 
mistakenly look for the pact or agreement that holds it all together. Political settlements 
are the outcome of agency in the sense of the complex interactions of the agency of 
many players. Defining a political settlement as an agreement or pact can give the 
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impression (even if unintended) that the pact or agreement is itself a policy variable that 
we can directly help to achieve. Policy-makers may be tempted to rush off trying to 
negotiate ‘conflict-ending agreements’ or even ‘inclusive’ variants of these, even if this 
was not intended by the researcher. This misunderstands the nature of the ‘agency’ that 
is at issue here. Thousands of organizations and sub-organizations (if not more) are 
typically involved in a society in rent-seeking decisions to deploy their holding power 
and capabilities to support, block or alter institutions. That is indeed agency, but not 
agency that is a policy variable at the system level. Political settlements are the 
outcomes of these complex organizational agency interactions.  
 
Political settlements are therefore like weather systems. Just as understanding weather 
systems and how they are evolving can be useful for telling us the likely effects of 
planting crops on a particular day, understanding the characteristics of a political 
settlement can tell us how particular institutions or policies may be distorted or blocked. 
For me, this is the most valuable application of the political settlements framework, to 
analyse and identify the implications of incremental changes in different directions. But 
the agreement to construct a political settlement itself is not a meaningful policy 
variable, just as (with our current state of knowledge) we cannot order all the complex 
planetary and inter-planetary factors that go into making a perfectly balmy summer’s 
day. This does not mean that agency does not have an effect on the structure of the 
political settlement, it just means that the effects are not determinate enough in a policy-
relevant sense. In just the same way, reducing our emission of greenhouses gases is 
very likely to have an effect on global warming but the complexity of the relationships 
makes it difficult to say with any precision whether the effect will be significant or not. 
In the same way that we can be risk averse and take steps to reduce emissions, we can 
support interventions that are more likely to nudge the evolution of political settlements 
in sustainable directions once we understand its characteristics. But this type of analysis 
is in its infancy and we do not know enough about how practical interventions can 
nudge political settlements in determinate directions.  
 
A second related error in the opposite direction is to think that a political settlement is 
in some sense a carefully constructed agreement to prevent violence and protecting its 
critical institutions is somehow important to preserve the peace. This can lead to the 
equally mistaken strategy of always wanting to work in alignment with elite interests 
(because we assume these elites have carefully put together institutions that are 
important for preventing violence). This too is mistaken. Many long-lasting social 
orders can not only be quite exclusionary and generate low growth, they can also 
involve much repression and violence. There is no reason to believe that these 
arrangements should be protected or respected in order to prevent conflict. We may be 
quite justified in wanting to change the political settlement and go against the interests 
of powerful groups, but not in the simplistic sense of the first mistake. There is no 
meaningful sense in which we can ‘renegotiate’ some more inclusive ‘agreement’. 
Rather, we need to have a much better understanding of the ways in which particular 
political settlements are evolving so that we can advise or help dissidents to 
incrementally chip away at this distribution of power with implementable policies or 
institutions that can help to nudge changes in particular directions. This is after all how 
political settlements incrementally change in any case, as a result of agency 
interventions at a micro level. This is a challenging research objective, and we are at an 
early stage here, but it is important to understand that the political settlement is the 
structure we want to change because it has implications for institutions and therefore 
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for economic and political outcomes. It is neither a policy variable that can be directly 
changed with an appropriate agreement, nor is it a fundamental conflict-prevention 
agreement that is always essential to preserve.  
 
 
 
